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THE DEATH OF THE STATE DEATH TAX CREDIT:
CAN IT BE RESUSCITATED?
Patrick R. Thiessen*

INTRODUCTION
How much would someone have to pay you to move to Florida?
For many retirees the question is moot; they are more than
willing to pay to move to Florida. However, for Howard, an
Illinois manufacturing company founder in his late 80s, a move
to Florida has very different financial implications. Howard is
fortunate, his business and, consequently, his future estate is
worth $50 million. If Howard had died in 2007 while domiciled
in Illinois, his estate would have owed $23,775,800 in federal
estate tax and an additional $6.4 million in Illinois estate tax, for
a total of over $30 million in taxes.' If Howard died with Florida
as his domicile, he would have owed the same amount in federal
estate tax, but he would have owed zero to the state of Florida
because that state had no state estate tax in 2007. For $6.4
million dollars, Howard might certainly consider that move to
the Sunshine State. 2
*Patrick Thiessen is an attorney in Colorado. The author would like to
thank Professor Michael J. Waggoner of the University of Colorado
School of Law for his assistance with this article.
1. This assumes that Howard died without any estate planning to minimize
federal estate tax exposure. Because Howard died in 2007, the applicable estate tax
credit is $2 million. I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2006). The first $2.5 million of his $48 million
dollar taxable estate produce a tax of $1,025,800 and the remaining amount is taxed
at 50%.
lRC § 2001(c) (2006).
See also Illinois Estate Tax Calculator,
http://www.illinoisattomeygeneral.gov/publications/estatetax.html (last visited Jan.
19, 2009). There are certainly other estate planning techniques that Howard should
consider to minimize his federal estate tax exposure that will not be solved by
moving to Florida.
2. This example is based on an article in FORBES. See Ashlea Ebeling, Suddenly
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The federal estate tax has been a fixture of the United States
tax code since 1916.3 The debate surrounding the advantages
and disadvantages of this tax have spawned academic discourse
for decades, but the opponents of the tax gained a substantial
victory in 2001 when Congress passed the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). 4 EGTRRA
phased out the federal estate tax over the course of eight years,
gradually raising the unified credit permitted for an estate and
ending the tax altogether on December 31, 2009 for one year.'
Consequently, there will be no estate tax in 2010, giving many
estate planners and octogenarians pause. Then, on January 1,
2011, the estate tax repeal sunsets and the tax rates and unified
credit as it existed prior to EGTRRA reappear. 6
Many United States citizens strongly oppose the estate tax
despite the fact that it applies to less than one percent of the
One commentator has suggested that this
population.7
opposition is based on the way that the debate has been framed
by the leaders of the estate tax opposition who have slickly
labeled it the "death tax," a move that has given them popular
support for repeal of the tax.8 This paper is not a discussion of
the federal estate tax per se; rather, it is a discussion of how
EGTRRA has shaped the states' estate tax schemes.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II will provide an
overview of EGTRRA's estate tax reforms and how they have
impacted the states. Part III will examine the lessons that might
It Matters a Lot, for Death Taxes, Where You Die, FORBES, Mar. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.forbes.com/maserati/billionaires2004/171.html.
3. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A Modern
Crisis in HistoricalPerspective,33 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 837 (2006).
4. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA),
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 1, 115 Stat. 38, Title V, § 501 (2001), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_congpublic_1aws&docid=f:publO16.107 (President Bush signed EGTRRA into law on
June 7, 2001)
5. Id.atTitleV,§511.
6. Id.
7. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, http://www.cbpp.org/pubs/
estatetax.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2009).
8. Daniel M. Matthews, A Fight to the Death: Slaying the Estate Tax Repeal Hydra,
28 WHITTIER L. REV. 663, 665 (2006).
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be learned from the history of the state death tax credit. Part IV
will explore how the states developed their state estate taxation
schemes based on the state death tax credit. Part V will look at
the congressional decision to repeal the state death tax credit
and the states' limited responses. Part VI will consider two
states' differing responses to EGTRRA, specifically Connecticut
and Illinois. Part VII will study the possible impact of the
evolving state estate taxation landscape on wealthy retirees and
Baby Boomers. Part VIII will recommend that the states
undertake to lobby the federal government for a reinstatement
of the state death tax credit because of growing state deficits and
because of the potential positive response they will receive
following the election of Barack Obama.
OVERVIEW OF EGTRRA

In 2001, Congress passed EGTRRA, a comprehensive tax reform
that drastically changed the landscape of federal and state estate
taxation. 9 EGTRRA increased the federal estate tax exclusion
from $675,000 in 2001 to $1 million in 2002 and 2003, $1.5 million
in 2004 and 2005, $2 million from 2006 to 2008, and $3.5 million
in 2009.10

For the states, and for purposes of this paper, the most
important aspect of EGTRRA is that it phased out and repealed
the state death tax credit." According to commentators, prior to
EGTRRA, the federal government permitted "a dollar-for-dollar
credit against the federal estate tax for [any] state death tax
actually paid, subject to a maximum [amount] calculated under
a table of percentages applied to the taxable estate."12 In 2003,

9. EGTRRA, supra note 4.
10. I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2006); EGTRRA, supra note 4, at § 521(a).
11. EGTRRA, supra note 4, at §§ 531, 532. The author does not use the term
"state death tax credit" to polarize the debate over the merits of this taxation
scheme. Rather, this is the term as provided for in the Code. See I.R.C. § 2011
(2006). Any reference to "the credit" in this paper is to the state death tax credit.
12. William S. Forsberg & Darren M. Wallace, Planningfor Property Interests in
More than One State After the Demise of the State Death Tax Credit, 18 PROB. & PROP.
46, 46 (2004).
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the actual state estate taxes collected under the credit constituted
approximately $6.7 billion of all states' revenue, or 1.2% of total
state tax revenues.'3 Yet in 2003, EGTRRA had already phased
out the state death tax credit by 50%.14 If not for the early phaseout of the credit, the states would have received approximately
$13.4 billion, or 2.4%, of total state tax revenues. 5
Pre-EGTRRA, IRC § 2011 permitted a credit for "any estate,
inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes actually paid to any State
or the District of Columbia . . . ."16 For example, in 2000, for a
decedent's estate of $2,040,000, the state death tax credit was
$106,800, which was paid to the state treasury where the
decedent was domiciled.'7
Before EGTRRA, most states had state death taxes, known
as "sponge" or "pick-up taxes," that equaled the maximum
amount of the death tax credit allowed under IRC § 2011.1
Some states had their own inheritance, succession, or estate
taxes, but these states only imposed a tax equal to the difference
between the separate tax and the credit, which meant that all
states imposed a death tax that was at least equal to the federal
credit.'9 These state estate taxes did not cost the states' residents
(more accurately the states' decedents' estates) anything
because, if the state did not impose a tax, then the same amount
would have been paid to the federal government instead. 20
Additionally, the states had few administrative costs associated
with this system because the IRS audited any dubious federal
estate returns to ensure that the decedent's personal
representative actually paid the state death tax. 21 Consequently,

13.
Wealth
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
(2005).
19.
20.
21.

Daphne A. Kenyon, States of Mind: You Can't Take it With You - Increase
Transfer Taxes, 36 STATE TAX NOTES 447, 447 (2005).
I.R.C. § 2011(b)(2)(B) (2006).
See Kenyon, supra note 13.
I.R.C. § 2011(a) (2006).
Id. at § 2011(b)(1).
Daniel B. Evans, The Constitutionality of Decoupling, 19 PROB. & PROP. 22. 23
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the states simply sat back and watched their coffers grow. 2 2 One
commentator stated that this "arrangement was equivalent to a
national estate tax and a federally determined grant to the

states."2 3
Unfortunately for the states, EGTRRA phased out the state
death tax credit from 100% in 2001, to 75% in 2002, 50% in 2003,
and 25% in 2004.24 After 2004, EGTRRA eliminated the credit,
which killed the revenue stream that the states had been
enjoying for eighty years. 25 Yet the federal estate tax was not
phased out until 2009, effectively requiring the states to more
quickly bear the burden of a loss of revenue and boosting federal
revenue earned from the estate tax, which is a clever ploy by
federal lawmakers. 26
For decedents who died after December 31, 2004, the credit
was replaced by a deduction against the federal gross estate for
any "estate, inheritance, legacy or succession taxes actually paid
to any state," but gone was the uniformity and ease of the state
death tax credit system. 27 Many states have been faced with the
choice between giving up the estate taxation revenue stream
altogether or passing a politically unpopular state estate tax.
Before various states' responses are examined, it is important to
first look at the history of the state death tax credit.
HISTORY OF THE STATE DEATH TAX CREDIT

State estate taxes were some of the earliest levies imposed by the

22. Id.
23. Harley Duncan & LeAnn Luna, Lending a Helping Hand: Two Governments
Can Work Together, 60 NAT'L TAX J. 663, 667 (2007).
24. EGTRRA, supra note 4, at § 531(a)(2).
25. Cooper, supra note 3, at 840.
26. See e.g., Raymond C. Sheppach, Exec. Dir. Nat'1 Governor's Assoc.,
Testimony before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Energy Policy,
Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs and the House Rules Subcommittee on
Technology on Unfunded Mandates: A Five-Year Review and Recommendations
for Change, May 24, 2001,
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem
.0f8c660ba7cf98dl8a278110501010a0/?vgnextoid=3cbe9e2flbO9lOlOVgnVCM100000
1a01010aRCRD.
27. Forsberg, supra note 12, at 47.
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states.2 8 Pennsylvania imposed the first state estate tax in 1826
by collecting an inheritance tax of 2.5% on estate assets passing
to collateral heirs.29 In 1916, Congress passed the federal estate
tax prior to the U.S. involvement in World War I.3 By 1916,
thirty-four state legislatures had enacted state estate taxes and
had increasingly begun to tax assets passing to lineal as well as
collateral heirs.3 ' The states were concerned that Congress had
invaded their estate tax turf, but this was not their greatest
worry.3 2
By 1924, many states, particularly the wealthier,
industrialized ones, became concerned that aggressive state
estate taxation would drive wealthy taxpayers out-of-state to
"rogue" states that did not have death taxes.33 Florida was the
best-known tax haven because its state leaders actively recruited
wealthy taxpayers with news that their state had no state estate
taxes along with inexpensive real estate and inviting weather. 34
Alabama also repealed their state death taxes and Nevada and
California considered similar repeals. 5
Increasingly faced with interstate competition for the
favored wealthy taxpayers, between 1924 and 1926, state leaders
participated in three national conferences to consider the
Most state
inherent problems of state estate taxation.36
representatives at these conferences viewed Florida as the
primary problem and felt that, unless Florida could be
convinced to change its ways, other states would be forced to
abandon their own estate taxes rather than suffer the continued
flight of wealthy individuals and capital to Florida.37
Fortuitously, Congress implemented a solution in 1926
28. WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 21.01 (3rd ed. 2008).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.; Cooper,supra note 3, at 847.
Hellerstein, supra note 28, at 21.01; Cooper, supra note 3, at 845.
Cooper, supra note 3, at 847-48.
Id. at 848.
Id.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 849-50.
Id. at 850.
See id.
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when it provided a state death tax credit of 80% of the federal
estate tax otherwise payable to the federal government.38 By
1935, almost three-quarters of the states adopted state death
taxes to take advantage of the credit, including Florida. 39 These
states imposed "pick-up" taxes that took full advantage of the
80% state death tax credit and increased their state death tax
revenues from $80 million in 1924 to over $180 million in 1930.40
The impact of the state death tax credit was threefold: (1) it
served as a basis for increasingly uniform state death tax
legislation that pegged the state tax to the credit, (2) it made for
more simplified estate planning, and (3) it eliminated the
competitive advantage of a state to repeal its death tax or impose
one that was less than the available credit.4 1 Moreover, the state
death tax was neutral because every state imposed one, because
it was fully credited against federal estate tax owed, and because
when more than one state imposed a state death tax, the state
death tax was apportioned. 42
This state death tax credit system survived for nearly eighty
years. 43 However, presently, EGTRRA's revocation of the state
death tax credit has caused many states to struggle to balance
revenue-generation and policymaking. On the one hand is the
state's need for revenue given that many states face budget
deficits. On the other hand is a renewed fear that a state's
wealthier residents will migrate to more taxpayer-friendly states
to avoid paying any state estate taxes.
STATE ESTATE TAXATION PRIOR TO EGTRRA

To fully appreciate EGTRRA's effects, it is important to
understand how state estate tax systems evolved to take full

38. Id. at 859.
39. Id. at 859-60.

40. Id. at 860-61.
41. Id. at 866-67.
42. Ellen K. Harrison, Estate Planning Under the Bush Tax Cuts, 60 NAT'L TAX
371, 373 (2007).

43. See Cooper, supra note 3, at 876.

J.
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advantage of the credit. As of 2001, only thirteen states had their
own independent estate tax. 44 The other thirty-seven states
relied solely on pick-up taxes tied to the state death tax credit.45
Of these thirty-seven states, thirty-two had "pure" pick-up taxes
tied directly to the Internal Revenue Code that automatically
tracked any changes Congress made to the Code. 46 These states'
taxes were based on the assumption of a state death tax credit in
the Code.47 The remaining five states imposed a "frozen" pickup tax that they tied to the Code as it existed on a specific date. 48
Because these latter states' tax provisions referenced the Code
prior to 2001, EGTRRA did not cause a de facto elimination of
these states' estate tax schemes.4 1
Prior to EGTRRA, the distinction between pure and frozen
pick-up taxes was insignificant.50 The only difference was that
the frozen pick-up states had to enact legislation to integrate any
changes Congress made to the Code, typically through a
legislative formality with a one-line declaration.5 '
44. Robert Yablon, Defying Expectations: Assessing the Surprising Resilience of
State Death Taxes, 59 TAx LAW. 241, 245 (2005).
45. Id. at 245-46.
46. Id. at 246.
47. Id. For example, Connecticut's tax provided:
The amount of the tax shall be the amount of the federal credit allowable
for the estate, inheritance, legacy, and succession taxes paid to any state or
the District of Columbia under the provisions of the federal internal
revenue code in force at the date of such decedent's death in respect to any
property owned by such decedent or subject to such taxes as part of or in
connection with the estate of such decedent.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-391 (2005).
48. Yablon, supra note 44, at 246. These five states include New York,
Arkansas, Kansas, Virginia, and Washington. Hellerstein, supra note 28, at
21.01[21[b][ii][B]. A state's choice between "pure" and "frozen" pick-up taxes is
based, at least in part, on whether the state's supreme court has interpreted the
state's constitution to permit the state to delegate legislative authority by
referencing a federal statute as amended. See also Geoffrey P. Scott, The 'Yardstick':
How the Ohio Additional Estate Tax is Coupled with Federal Law, 14 OHIO PROB. L.J. 20
(2003).
49. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 28, at 21.01[2][b][ii][B].
50. Yablon, supra note 44, at 246.
51. Id. For example, New York imposes an estate tax in "an amount equal to
the maximum amount allowable against the federal estate tax as a credit for state

death taxes . . .," but it further provides that "[flor purposes of this article, any
reference to the internal revenue code means the United States Internal Revenue
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However, post-EGTRRA, the distinction between pure and
frozen states has become extremely important. After 2004, a
state with a pure pick-up tax system gathered no tax revenue
from its state estate tax because the state tax law referenced the
state death tax credit in the Code that EGTRRA phased out.52 In
contrast, states in the frozen category were insulated from
EGTRRA's repeal of the credit because their state provisions
referenced a pre-EGTRRA Code that provided for a state death
tax credit and, consequently, a state estate tax. One solution for
a pure pick-up tax state has been to amend its state estate tax
and "decouple" it from the Code to independently levy a tax.
This solution is examined in Part VI.
CONGRESS' DECISION TO REPEAL THE STATE DEATH TAX
CREDIT

Prior to EGTRRA's repeal of the credit, the Clinton
administration discussed repealing the credit as a source of
federal revenue." The Clinton administration also discussed
repealing the credit as a source of federal revenue. 5 4 The credit's
existence was increasingly in jeopardy as the federal estate tax
repeal movement gained momentum in the late 1990s. 5 The
states were certainly aware of the implications of a repeal of the
credit.56 Nevertheless, the leading states' advocacy groups,
including the National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL)
and the National Governors Association (NGA), mustered no

Code of 1986, with all amendments enacted on or before July twenty-second,
nineteen hundred ninety-eight. . . ." N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 951(a) and 952, (McKinney
2006).
52. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 28, at 21.01[2][b][ii][A].
53. John M. Janiga & Louis S. Harrison, The Case for the Retention of the State
Death Tax Credit in the Federal Transfer Tax Scheme: 'Just Say No' to a Deduction, 21
PEPP. L. REV. 695, 698 (1994).
54. Id.

55. For a description of the origins of the federal estate tax repeal movement,
see Matthews, supra note 8, at 666-74.
56. See, e.g., Repeal of Federal Estate Tax Would Have Effect on States, FED'N TAX
ADMIN. BULL. (Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/ratefb-

0701.html.
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response." These groups had a hard time defending the credit
as a revenue-sharing device alone because the federal
government did not really benefit from the arrangement.58
Moreover, because the NCSL and the NGA are bipartisan
organizations and many Republicans oppose the estate tax, these
organizations did not have enough member support to directly
argue the merits of the estate tax."
During the time leading up to the passage of EGTRRA,
President Bush and the House of Representatives proposed a
plan that provided that the estate tax and the death tax credit
would be phased-out at the same time, in 2010.60 However, the
Senate Finance Committee and, ultimately, the Conference
Committee creatively phased-out the credit five years before the
repeal of the estate tax in 2009, placing a disproportionate
burden on the states in the form of lost revenue.6' In 2005, all of
the federal estate tax collected went directly to the federal
government, unreduced by any state death tax credit. 6 2 When
enacted, the NGA estimated that the early phase-out of the
credit would cost the states $36.5 billion, representing one-fourth
of the total $138 billion, ten-year cost of EGTRRA's repeal of the
estate tax. 63 This disproportionate phase-out represents an
estimated 26% of the total cost incurred, despite the fact that the
highest pre-EGTRRA credit received by the states was only 16%
of decedent's estates over $10,040,000.64
The Senate Finance Committee's acceleration of the credit
phase-out surprised many governors and angered state leaders

57. Yablon, supra note 44, at 247.
58. Id.
59. Id. (In fact, Yablon likens these groups' reticence to "mortuary directors
lobbying against mandatory seat belt laws because they would be bad for
business.").
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Kevin Sack, States Expecting to Lose Billions From Repeal of U.S. Estate Tax,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2001,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9COCE4DD1630F932A5755COA9679C8B63.
64. I.R.C. § 2011(b)(1) (2006).
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because they were not consulted. 65 As a result, the states
attempted some eleventh-hour lobbying.66 The NGA was a
vocal critic of the credit phase-out and a spokesman stated that it
"creat[ed] a severe, disproportional impact on states ..."67 The
spokesman also indicated that a majority of the nation's
governors were "absolutely united in opposing any action that
would discriminate against states in the phase-out of the state
and federal estate taxes." 68 Senator Robert Graham (D-Fl), a
former governor of Florida, supported this lobbying effort.69
Senator Graham submitted an amendment to the Senate bill that
provided for an equal phase-out of the federal estate tax and the
credit instead of the original accelerated credit phase-out.7 0 He
argued that his amendment better represented President Bush's
original plan and better protected the federalist principles of
power sharing with the states.71
Unfortunately for the states, Senator Graham's amendment
did not carry the day. 72 Senator Charles Grassley, chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee, opposed Senator Graham's
amendment because the original bill gave the states a phase-out
period of several years to enact their own state death taxes and
indicated that the disproportionate phase-out was a result of a
political compromise.73 Senator Grassley's comments persuaded
65. See Sack, supra note 63. Frank Shafroth, the director of state-federal
relations for the governors' association, stated:
This was a decision made without any consultation whatsoever or any
consideration of the consequences. In some ways, I'm hearing more
grumbling from Republicans than Democrats. Remember, at the time this
happened, the White House, Senate and House were controlled by
Republicans, and I think they thought this would bring an era of greater
federalism rather than less federalism.
66. See id.
67. Sheppach, supra note 26.
68. John Nagy, States Protest Senate's Estate Tax Reform, May 22, 2001,
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=136&languageld=1&con
tentld=14354.
69. See id.
70. See 147 CONG. REC. S5097-98 (daily ed. May 17, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Graham).
71. See id.
72. 147 CONG. REC. S5253 (daily ed. May 21, 2001).
73. See 147 CONG. REC. S5099 (daily ed. May 17, 2001) (statement of Sen.
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the Senate and, consequently, Senator Graham's amendment
failed.7 4 As a result, EGTRRA phased out the credit by the end
of 2004 and many states were left to develop their own state
estate taxation schemes.
STATE RESPONSE POST-EGTRRA

In keeping with Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis' vision of
the states as "laboratories of democracy," the states have
responded to the loss of revenue from EGTRRA's repeal of the
credit in different ways. 75 If "the states [had] taken no action in
response to EGTRRA, fewer than half would have imposed any
state death taxes after January 1, 2005 . . . ."76 The states' ability
to experiment in this area has been curtailed somewhat by the
fear that an imposition of state estate taxes will cause wealthy
citizens to migrate to tax-free states.
Because of the diversity of the states and their political
leadership, they have followed a number of courses in dealing
with post-EGTRRA revenue cuts. State laws in this area remain
in a constant flux, making it difficult for the author to guarantee
the accuracy of state laws, but responses fall into several general
categories.77 The first course followed in many pick-up states,
and seemingly requiring little political will, was to do nothing
and allow EGTRRA to repeal the state's entire death tax regime.
Twenty-three states chose this course of action.78 A second
course, chosen by three states, Arkansas, South Carolina, and

Grassley).
74. 147 CONG. REC. S5253, supra note 72.
75. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
76. Cooper, supra note 3, at 877.
77. Kentucky is an example of a state that might soon be changing its law
because one legislator proposed decoupling Kentucky's state death tax from the
Code.
See Proposed KY. HB 262, J. Wayne, Mar. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.1rc.ky.gov/record/08RS/HB262.htm. The following website purports to
provide accurate information on all fifty states' estate tax schemes: CCH Financial
Planning Toolkit, http://www.finance.cch.com/text/c50sl5dl70.asp (last visited Feb.
28, 2009).
78. See Cooper,supra note 3, at 877-78.
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South Dakota, was to affirmatively repeal their state estate taxes
in light of EGTRRA. 79 It appears that these states' leaders could
not stand to have an ineffectual state estate tax on the books. A
third course, also requiring little political will and followed by
many frozen pick-up states, was to do nothing because the state
continued to collect tax revenues by referencing the preEGTRRA Code. 0 Although this course is similar to the preEGTRRA estate tax world, the federal government is no longer
sharing the revenue with the states. State residents in these
states will owe the same amount to the federal government
regardless of the state scheme.
Instead, these states are
collecting their own revenue by referencing the pre-EGTRRA
version of I.R.C. § 2011 and taxing their citizens' estates while
other states are not levying a state estate tax.81
The fourth course has been labeled "decoupling" by
commentators and practitioners. States following this course
have enacted new state death taxes replacing pick-up taxes tied
to the state death tax credit with decoupled, stand-alone estate
taxes often referencing the pre-EGTRRA Code.8 2 Nine states
have followed this course and at least two additional states,
Minnesota and Oregon, took legislative action to clarify that
EGTRRA did not repeal their state death taxes.83 To better
understand how the states have grappled with the choice
between these courses it is helpful to look at two examples:
Connecticut and Illinois.
CONNECTICUT

After EGTRRA, Connecticut sought to raise the $55 million
that it projected to lose in estate tax revenue each year. 4 In 2003,
79. Id. at 877.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Harlan J. Levy, For Six Months Only, A Higher Death Tax, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
2004, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9FO6EFD7173A
F93BA25754COA9629C8B63&sec-&spon=&pagewanted=all.
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the Connecticut legislature "temporarily" decoupled its state
estate tax from the Code for decedents who died between July 1,
2004 and January 1, 2005.85 The decoupled tax had a lower
exclusion amount of $1 million, compared to the $1.5 million
federal exclusion. 6 Additionally, the temporary tax imposed a
tax 1.3% greater than Connecticut's pre-EGTRRA tax.87 For
example, a $1.5 million estate of a Connecticut-domiciled
decedent who died in November 2004 owed no federal estate
tax, but owed $84,000 to Connecticut.88
The Connecticut legislature made this "temporary"
decoupling permanent in June, 2005.89 That law imposes a 5%
tax on estates over $2 million and a 16% tax on estates over $10
million.90 The tax was a compromise between Connecticut's
Republican governor and a Democratic-controlled legislature to
partially deal with large projected state budget deficits.9' The
tax has raised revenues. For example, Connecticut collected
$166,972,426 from 277 estates during Fiscal Year 2006-07,
compared to the $111,823,742 it collected in Fiscal Year 2002-03
under the state death tax credit system that EGTRRA was then
phasing out.92
The future of Connecticut's estate tax is still not secure. The
85. 2003 Act. 2003, June 30 Sp.Sess., P.A. 03-1, § 59, eff. from passage (Aug. 16,
2003),
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/act/Pa/2003PA-00001-ROOHB06802SS2-PA.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).

86. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-391 (2005) at§ 12-391(c) and I.R.C. §
2010(c) (2006).
87. Jeffrey A. Cooper et al., State Estate Taxes After EGTRRA: A Long Day's
Journey Into Night, 17 Quinnipac Prob. L.J. 317, 326 (2004).
88. Levy, supra note 84.
89. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
90. Id. at (g).

§

12-391 (2005).

91. William Yardley, Connecticut Lawmakers Restore Estate Tax in Move to Balance
Budget, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2005, available at http://query.nytimes
.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501E2D61338F93BA35755COA9639C8B63.
Connecticut's budget deficit was estimated to be $150 million in 2006 and $300
million in 2007.
92. Connecticut Department of Revenue Services 2006-07 Annual Report at 37,
http://www.ct.gov/drs/lib/drs/research/annualreport/drs-fy07_annual-report.pdf
(last visited Feb. 21, 2009); Connecticut Department of Revenue Services 2003-04
and 2004-05 Annual Report at 59, http://www.ct.gov/drs/lib/drs/research
/annualreport/drs-annual-report-fy04_and-fyO5.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
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state's Republican legislators and governor have proposed
eliminating the tax.13 Opponents of Connecticut's decoupling
fear that the tax will cause the state's wealthy residents to flee to
states such as Florida that have no state estate tax. 94
Nevertheless, Connecticut is an example of a state that chose to
implement a state estate tax to replace the lost revenue from
EGTRRA's repeal of the credit.
ILLINOIS
Before EGTRRA, Illinois imposed a pure pick-up state death
tax. With the passage of EGTRRA, Illinois expected to lose $1.2
billion between 2003 and 2007 as a result of the credit phaseout.9 5 In 2003, Illinois decoupled its estate tax by imposing a tax
and making it retroactive against decedents who died after
January 1, 2003.96 The law increased marginal estate tax rates by
3%, from 9% to 12%, depending on the size of the estate.9 7
Illinois' system is particularly complex, dictating three
different results depending on when the decedent dies.98 For the
first time period, decedents who died between January 1, 2003
and on or before December 31, 2005, the Illinois law referenced
the pre-EGTRRA Code in effect on December 31, 2001.99 A
decedent who died during this period had his estate taxed as if
the phase-out of the federal credit did not occur, but the
decedent still received any increase in the applicable federal
exclusion. 00
This period can be characterized as "partial
decoupling." 0 1
93. Editorial, House Republicans Weigh In, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 27, 2007;

Mark Pazniokas, Criticisms Emerging to Schools Initiative: Governor Has Yet to
CampaignAggressively For Changes, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 14, 2007.

94. House Republicans Weigh In, supra note 93.
95. Susan T. Bart, This is Me Leaving You: Illinois Departsfrom the Federal Estate
Tax Scheme, 92 ILL. B.J. 20, 22 (2004).
96. Id. at 20.

97. Id. at 21.
98. See id.
99. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2 § 2(a) (West 2008).
100. Id.
101. Cooper et al., supra note 87, at 330.
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Second, for decedents who die between January 1, 2006 and
December 31, 2009, Illinois completely decouples and imposes
an annual exclusion of $2 million.102 Third, for decedents who
die in 2010, Illinois will return to a pure pick-up structure,
hoping to recapture any reinstated state death tax credit system
in 2011.103 Of course, the Illinois legislature is likely to revisit
this provision if Congress does not reenact the credit. Finally, to
avoid unfair taxation, in 2005, the Illinois Legislature amended
the law to exclude property having a tax situs outside of Illinois
from the decedent's gross estate. 104 Despite his best efforts, the
Annual Reports author was unable to provide pre- and postplan revenue comparisons because the Illinois Department of
Revenue does not appear to publicly report estate tax revenues
collected. 05 Nonetheless, Illinois' hybrid plan is a great example
of the lengths that states have had to go to protect their state
estate tax revenues in the face of EGTRRA's uncertain future.
EGTRRA's ESTATE TAX IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREES
By undoing the unification of state estate tax schemes, EGTRRA
could cause many wealthy retirees to rethink their choice of
domicile, and consequently the state that imposes estate taxes on
their estates, if any, upon their death. A change in retiree
thinking may be led by the soon-to-retire-en-masse Baby
Boomers. It is often said that the Baby Boomer generation
changes social rules as they go due to their size and
independence. The way that they distribute their assets upon
death might also change the rules. As demonstrated through the
example of Howard in Part I, an individual's domicile choice can
have a drastic impact on the amount of state estate taxes that his
estate owes and, consequently, the amount of assets he is able to
102. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2 § 2(b) (West 2008).
103. See id. at § 2(c).
104. David A. Berek, Three New Illinois Laws Affect Estate-PlanningPractice, 93 ILL.
B.J. 600, 600 (2005).
105. For example, there is no individual breakdown for estate tax collected in the
2006 Annual Report of Collections and Distributions. See http://tax.illinois.gov
/Publications/AnnualReport/2006/2006tablel.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
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leave to his heirs. The seventy-eight million Baby Boomers
approaching retirement are already more mobile than prior
generations, and wealthy Boomers are uniquely situated to
uproot themselves and change domiciles in response to different
states' estate tax treatment. 0 6
MOBILITY OF RETIREES - LED BY THE BABY BOOMERS

Baby Boomers are already willing to move to get what they
want. In a study of 2,000 Boomer homeowners in their fifties
and sixties with annual household incomes over $100,000, only
one in five respondents said that they would prefer to stay in
their current home. 10 7 Boomers' decisions are less likely to be
influenced by a desire to be near their children, grandchildren,
or parents. In that same survey, 63% of Boomers said enjoying
their home is a priority above or equal to spending time with
grandchildren, and just 35% said they would relocate to be
closer to family.10
These wealthy Boomers could also be influenced by
different state estate tax schemes. For example, in Connecticut
many high-income residents already own second homes in
Florida and other warm-weather, tax-friendly states, making
changing domicile easy and relatively costless.109 If wealthy
residents choose to make tax-free states such as Florida their
domicile, Connecticut could lose as many as one of three dollars
from their estate tax collection because there will be fewer
taxable estates." 0 This is not beyond the realm of possibilities."'

106. See generally Marilyn Alva, They Find Charm in the South, INVESTOR'S
BUSINESS DAILY, Mar. 24, 2008.

107. Amy Hoak, Trendsetting Baby Boomers Ready for 'Me Time' in Homes, WALL
ST.
J. ONLINE,
Oct.
5,
2006,
http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell
/markettrends/20061005-hoak.html?refresh=on.
108. Id.
109. Editorial, Estates of Pain: Connecticut's Governor to Constituents: Get out of
Aug. 1, 2005, available at
Here Before You Die!, WALL ST. J.,
http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007043.
110. Id.

111. Id. (citing Jon Bakija & Joel Slemrod, Do the Rich Flee from High State Taxes?
Evidence from Federal Estate Tax Returns, NBER WORKING PAPER No. 10645,
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It is not entirely clear that changes in state estate taxes or
other tax levels have historically affected the migration of a
majority of the elderly though.112 In fact, there is some evidence
that high elderly in-migration to a state might actually cause an
elimination or reduction in taxes because these new citizens
lobby for such a change.113 Nevertheless, there is evidence that
very wealthy retirees' domicile choice is influenced by higher
state estate taxes.'14 Wealthy retirees are exactly the kind of
residents that a state wants to keep because they have money to
contribute to the economy, they can afford to pay for their
medical care, and they are revenue sources in the form of
property, sales, and income taxes. States that have high estate
taxes and sales taxes can influence wealthy retirees' decisions in
statistically significant, but modest, negative ways as
demonstrated by the fewer federal estate tax returns that are
being filed in states with higher taxation.115
The current worries of state leaders over interstate
competition for retirees echoes the sentiments of state leaders
before the state death tax credit was enacted in 1926.
Nonetheless, retirees are much more likely to exploit the current
state differences because retiree mobility is greater in the 2 1st
century than in the 2 0th century, due to increased ease and speed
of air and land travel, as well as the ability to stay connected to
loved ones through mass communication.16
Baby boomers and retirees' decisions are not solely
motivated by taxation, or even estate taxation. Many retirees,
and boomers-soon-to-be retirees, have strong social and family
support structures in their communities that they are unwilling
to leave. It is also true that any state estate taxes saved will not
Cambridge, MA: Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, 2004). See also Sarah E. Nutter,
State Estate, Inheritance,and Gift Taxes: Uncertainty at the Federal Level Passes Down to
the States, 46 STATE TAX NOTES 461 (2007).
112. See, e.g., Karen Smith Conway & Jonathan C. Rork, State "Death" Taxation

and Elderly Migration - The Chicken or the Egg, 59 NAT'L TAX
113. See id.

114. See Estates of Pain, supra note 109.
115. See id.
116. Kenyon, supra note 13, at 451.

J.97, 97 (2006).
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actually be saved by the retiree making the decision to stay or
move; rather, that retiree's heirs or beneficiaries will experience
those tax savings. Nevertheless, many wealthy retirees that
could be subject to state estate taxation have a primary residence
and a vacation home. By carefully considering the ramifications
of their domicile choice, these retirees could maintain their
existing social and family networks by making their vacation
home their domicile and "vacationing" in their former, taxunfriendly state.
DOMICILE CHOICE

Post EGTRRA, estate planners and individuals with sizeable
estates must increasingly be concerned with the implications
that an individual's domicile choice might have an estate
taxation. For example, an individual with a $5 million estate in
New Jersey, which is a frozen pick-up tax state, could move to
Florida, a pure pick-up state, with no current estate taxation, and
save $322,720 in state death taxes." 7
As with most jurisdictional issues, domicile, rather than
residence, is an operative term. Domicile is defined as "one's
actual place of abode, the place where one intends to remain
permanently or indefinitely with no intent to return to the
former place of abode.""' Because an individual may have more
than one residence, the legal concept of domicile developed to
resolve jurisdictional conflicts by establishing that an individual
may only have one domicile.119 Every person has a domicile at
all times and, here for estate tax purposes, that person has no
more than one domicile at a time.120
117. N.J. STAT.

§

54:38-1 (2007); FLA. STAT. §198.02 (2007).

New Jersey has a

$675,000 exemption. The taxable estate was therefore $4,325,000, or $5 million
minus $675,000. The taxable estate amount is then taxed according to the preEGTRRA state death tax credit schedule found in I.R.C. § 2011(b)(1) (2006).
118. Estate of Palmer v. Comm'r of Revenue, No. 1110, slip op. at 1 (Mass.
App.Ct. 2002) (citing Commonwealth v. Davis, 284 Mass. 41, 50, 187 N.E. 33, 37
(1933).
119. See Wit v. Berman, 306 F.3d 1256, 1260 (2d Cir. 2002)).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11(2) (1971); see also
California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 611 (1978) (per curium) (determining jurisdictional
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A taxpayer seeking to establish a new domicile in a more
tax-friendly locale should complete a number of steps besides
simply moving to ensure that his or her heirs have the best
chance of demonstrating domicile upon death. The taxpayer
should: (1) register to vote; (2) relocate bank accounts, safe
deposit boxes, and mailing addresses for correspondences with
financial institutions to the new state; (3) obtain a driver's license
and register automobiles in the new state; (4) document the new
domicile on various personal records such as credit card
accounts and revised last wills and testaments; (5) use the new
address on federal income tax and gift tax returns; (6) file
necessary documentation showing a claim and eligibility for a
real estate tax homestead exemption if applicable; (7) file a
resident state income tax return; and (8) locate professional
advisors in the new state, specifically an estate planner familiar
with the new state's tax laws.121 Additionally, in some states,
such as Florida, a taxpayer may file a declaration establishing
domicile and abandoning the previous domicile.122
The length of time in the new location is immaterial for
determining domicile; it can be as short as a week.123 Perhaps a
particularly wealthy or tax-averse taxpayer might even move to
a tax-friendly state for their final medical or hospice care to
establish domicile. Nevertheless, the taxpayer's estate must
meet the burden of demonstrating the new domicile and this
might prove difficult in such a circumstance.124 Of course, the
personal representative's attorney should make the argument
that a new domicile was established to prevent adverse state
estate taxation.125
questions involving the estate of Howard Hughes).

121. WILLIAM P. STRENG, TAX PLANNING FOR RETIREMENT, at 19.01[1] (2007).
122. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.17(2) (2007) (entitled "Manifesting and
Evidencing Domicile in Florida," permits a person having established domicile in
Florida to file a statement of residence with the local court).
123. Palmer, supra note 118, at 1.
124. See id. at 2; see also Thiemann v. Estate of Clark 2004 WL 1194062, slip op. at
5 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 13, 2004) (applying Connecticut statute that placed burden

of demonstrating domicile on taxpayer).
125. See Brian Mackey, Heir to $8 Million Trust Seeks Ruling on Domicile, CHI.
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Once a retiree has changed domicile, the retiree's estate
planner can instruct the retiree to use techniques to further
transfer wealth to the new domicile state, assuming that the
retiree still maintains a home in the prior state. The retiree can
transfer valuable tangible personal property, such as cars, art, or
jewelry to the new domicile state. 126 For example, legendary art
dealer Ileana Sonnabend passed away in October 2007, with an
art collection worth more than $1 billion. 127 She lived in New
York, which has a state estate tax for estates over $1 million.128
Her heirs have been forced to sell much of her collection to cover
the $600 million that is owed in estate taxes, approximately $160
million which is probably owed to the state of New York,
assuming that her entire estate is associated with New York as
the domicile state. 129 If Ms. Sonnabend had died domiciled in
Florida, and had moved her entire art collection to that tax-free
state, her heirs would have been approximately $160 million
richer. 130 Thus, retirees who are willing to change their domicile
should also carefully consider the location of their tangible
personal property.
A retiree might also consider converting his or her real
estate interest into personal property by means of a trust or a
limited liability company.' Real estate is part of the decedent's
estate in the state where the real estate is located, but an LLC

DAILY L. BULL., June 6, 2007.
126. See Andrew R. Gelman, et al., HORNER PROBATE PRACTICE AND ESTATES,
§ 82:1, 2007.

127. Carol Vogel, A Colossal Private Sale by Heirs of a Dealer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2008, at E27.
128. Roberta Smith, Ileana Sonnabend Dies; Art Figure was 92, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2007, at C10; N.Y. TAX LAW Art. 26, Part 1, § 951(a) (McKinney 2007).
129. Vogel, supra note 127.
130. See N.Y. TAX LAW supra note 128, at § 952(a). The $160 million owed to
New York was calculated based on the following: Assuming that the estate is
worth $1 billion, subtracting $1 million for the state exemption, the taxable estate is
$999 million. New York is a frozen pick-up state so the tax imposed is based on the
pre-EGTRRA state death tax credit found in I.R.C. § 2011. The tax imposed under
§ 2011 is $1,082,800 for the first $10,040,000 of the taxable estate and 16% thereafter.
This arrives at approximately $160 million owed. In contrast, Florida had no state
estate tax in 2007 because it is a pure pick-up state. See FLA. STAT. § 198.02 (2007).
131. Gelman et al., supra note 126, at § 82:1.
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membership interest is intangible personal property and might
be associated with the tax-free domicile state.'32 Many estateplanning practitioners believe that this setup could avoid
taxation.133 Yet, this solution might not always work because
some states like Massachusetts have taken the unofficial position
that if the entity has no "business purpose," that state will
consider the real estate to be located in Massachusetts for estate
taxation purposes. 34 Nevertheless, the claim that an LLC serves
a business purpose can be enhanced if certain corporate
formalities are followed: rent is paid to the LLC by individuals
living in the real estate, whether family or third parties, and the
LLC is a multi-member LLC, rather than a single-member.135
The estate could also argue that the LLC serves the business
purpose of limiting liability for the family and/or transferring
real estate to numerous heirs in a more manageable fashion. The
Service would likely argue that these justifications do not set
forth a business purpose, but it is not clear which tax-imposing
states, besides Massachusetts, will take a similar harsh stance.' 6
Certainly for valuable real estate, it is likely worth the effort.
The aforementioned planning techniques are almost certain to
lead to an increase in litigation in the state courts.' 7
For Boomers or retirees who are not yet willing to move
because the future of both the federal and state estate tax is too
unpredictable, there can still be costs. Reopening an estate plan
to deal with changes to the federal or state estate tax can
commonly cost anywhere from $500 to $3500, if not more,
depending on the complexity of the plan.138 For many wealthy
retirees, these fees, along with a proper domicile choice, must be
132. See id.
133. James G. Dickinson, Holding Out-of-State Real Estate in Limited Liability
Companies, 16 OHIO PROB. L.J. 154 (2006); c.f David W. Woodburn, Common Real
Estate Issues for Estate Planners, 18 OHIO PROB. L.J. 150 (2008).
134. Ann B. Lesk, Estate Planning for Real Estate Owners, 799 P.L.I. 81, 87-88
(2006).
135. Dickinson, supra note 133.
136. See, e.g., Strangi v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 2003 WL 21166046 (2003).
137. Gelman et al., supra note 126, at § 82:1.
138. Levy, supra note 84.
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carefully considered because of the sizeable savings in state
estate taxes these decisions could one day mean for their estates.
THE FUTURE OF THE STATE RESPONSE

The states should consider lobbying to have the state death tax
credit reinstated. By the time that the states began their
lobbying efforts to protect the state death tax credit in 2001, it
was too late; they were forced to deal with the early phase-out of
the state death tax credit and its eventual repeal. If the states are
going to protect what has traditionally been their revenue
source, estate taxation, the states should learn from this mistake
and mobilize their efforts to ensure that their voice is heard
during the federal estate tax debate that is likely to develop
during 2009.
In encouraging the states to lobby for a renewal of the
credit, it is important to note that technically speaking, the state
death tax credit will be reinstated in 2011 if Congress allows
EGTRRA to sunset.'3 9 Therefore, if Congress takes no action, the
states need not have taken any action because in 2011, the state
death tax credit system will be reinstated. There will only be the
minor problem that some states might need to amend their laws
to once again pick-up the credit, but no other action will be
required. Yet, this outcome is by no means certain and it is
much more likely, as will be demonstrated in Part VII.C, that
Congress and the future president will not permit EGTRRA to
sunset without enacting a replacement tax plan.
As the post-EGTRRA tax reform debate heats up, the states
must participate in this discussion to have Congress reinstate the
credit. The NCSL and the NGA could play a unique role in
lobbying for the states' collective interests. The states' decision
to lobby is particularly critical in light of three factors: (1)
increasingly large state deficits are putting pressure on many
states, (2) the aforementioned mobility of the Baby Boomers and
resulting interstate competition limits the states' individual state
139. EGTRRA, supra note 4, at §901.
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solutions, and (3) the recent election of President Barack Obama
and Democratic victories in the House and Senate could create a
political environment where the federal estate tax is more likely
to be reinstated.
STATE DEFICITS

As cited in Part II, state estate taxes constituted about $ 6.7
billion of all states' revenue in 2003.140 The NGA estimated that
the total cost to the states of the state death tax credit phase-out
and repeal will cost between $50 and $100 billion. 141 For
example, Wisconsin's state estate tax expired on January 1, 2008
and that state expects to lose $100 million per year, or
approximately 2% of its state budget.142
Most states are facing financial crises. Forty-three of the
fifty states face budgetary shortfalls.143 Even as states closed a
$40 billion budgetary gap for fiscal year 2009, they face an
additional $97 billion in additional budget deficits during 2009
and 2010.144 The states with the largest budgetary gaps are
Arizona (24.2%), New York (20%), and California (18%).145
Arizona's budget deficit is 1.2 billion dollars.146 The New York
governor's budget office is projecting a $12.5 billion shortfall in
2010.147 By pure dollar amount, California has the largest
California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
shortfall.148
140. Kenyon, supra note 13, at 447.
141. Sheppach, supra note 26.
142. Avrum D. Lank, State's Estate Tax to Slumber: Progression of Laws will Rescind
Levy - For Now, MILWAUKEE J.SENTINEL, Dec. 16, 2007, at D1.
143. Ceci Connolly, States Want $176 Billion Slice of Stimulus, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
available at
2008,
2008/12/01/AR2008120102622.html.

144. NCSL NEWS, New National Survey Reveals Escalating Budget Crisisfor States,
Dec. 4,2008, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2008/prl20408SBUDec08.htm.
145. Id.
146. New Senate Leader Sees Dec. Session, Arizona Republic, Dec. 1, 2008, available
at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/12/01/20081201budgetl2Ol.html.
147. Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Fails to Reach Deal on Budget Deficits, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2008, at A27.
148. See Ceci Connolly, States Want $176 Billion Slice of Stimulus, WASH. POST,
Dec. 2, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artide
/2008/12/01/AR2008120102622.html.

20091

DEATH OF THE STATE DEATH TAX CREDIT

333

declared a fiscal emergency for his state in light of an estimated
state deficit between $11 billion and $28 billion. 149
A reinstatement of the state death tax credit might temper
some states' budgetary woes. It is important to remember that
the revenue that would be generated from a reinstatement of the
state death tax credit is a drop in the proverbial bucket for many
of these states. The former credit system only provided states
with roughly 1.2% of their revenue, on average.5 0 Nonetheless,
the cost of lobbying for the state death tax credit will be
minimal; there will not be any large advertising or campaign
expenditures. Additionally, the states' decision is being made
against the backdrop of the largest intergenerational wealth
transfer in American history that is currently underway - the
Boston College Center on Wealth and Philanthropy has
estimated that $41 trillion will change hands by 2052.15' The
states should certainly be interested in taxing this large wealth
transfer, should the federal estate tax survive. Finally, estate
taxation has traditionally been a state revenue source, or at least
a shared revenue source, and a victory would signal that the
federalist system is still protecting the states' sphere of influence.
IMPACT OF THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

The election of President Barack Obama could drastically
impact the future of the federal estate tax and, as a result, the
state death tax credit. With Democrats in control of the
executive and legislative branches, the debate over the future of
the federal estate tax will likely increase as the one-year repeal of
the federal estate tax on January 1, 2010 looms. A closer
understanding of the President's plan underscores the
importance of the states' lobbying efforts.
In 2005, then Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) called a
Republican plan to repeal the estate tax "mind boggling" in light

149. Id.
150. See Kenyon, supra note 13, at 447.
151. John Leland, Breaking the Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at H1.
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of the cost of the war in Iraq and the effort to rebuild after
Hurricane Katrina.'5 2 Obama would permanently extend the
2009 estate tax law and exemption of $3.5 million.15 3 He would
permanently repeal the state death tax credit.5 4 From 2008 to
2018, the Obama proposal would general $292 billion in estate
tax revenue, about 60% of the $490 billion projected revenue
under the current law.' 5 The average estate tax rate in 2011
would be 19.4% with the largest estates (greater than $20
million) paying 22.5% on average, and smaller estates (less than
$5 million) paying 7% on average.5 6
Congress has also generated several proposals for the estate
5
tax.' 7 Rather than permit the estate tax to sunset in 2010, the
Senate has already debated proposals to make permanent the
$3.5 million exemption that will occur in 2009, with annual
adjustments for inflation. 58 The House of Representatives has
also generated several plans with exemptions ranging from $2
million to $3.5 million and rates ranging from 45% to 55%.151
The states must participate in the debates by lobbying to
have the state death tax credit reinstated. The importance of
these lobbying efforts is highlighted by any potential exodus of
wealthy retirees from taxing states to tax-free states as discussed
above in Part VII and to curtail the growing state deficits
discussed in Part VIII.A.
STATE LEADERS SHOULD LOBBY FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THE
STATE DEATH TAX CREDIT

The states should lobby Congress to reinstate the state death
152. Leonard E. Burman et al., Back from the Grave: Revenue and Distributional
Effects of Reforming the Federal Estate Tax, 23 Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center,
Oct. 20,
2008,
available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411777
.back._grave.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 24.
157. Id. at 27-33.
158. Editorial, New Hope for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at A24.
159. Burman et al., supra note 152, at 29-31.
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tax credit as Congress and the new president likely will craft a
solution prior to the federal estate tax sunset at the end of 2009.
At least one commentator has argued that if the federal
government refuses to reinstate the credit, it should increase
grants to the states to make up for the lost revenue from the
repeal of the state death tax credit.160 However, until the future
of the federal estate tax is certain, the states should at least try to
have their voice heard during any upcoming estate tax debate.
The states' efforts could be led by the intergovernmental lobby,
which is a loose coalition of more than sixty organizations that
are dedicated to advancing state and local interests in
Washington. 6 ' However, the revenue that would be created by
a reinstatement of the credit is most closely aligned with the
interests of the National Conference of State Legislators(NCSL)
and the National Governors Association (NGA).
The NGA is a particularly successful lobbying group and
has a visible presence in Washington.16 2 The Unfunded Mandate
Reform Act provides some anecdotal evidence of the influence
that state interest groups can have on the federal government. 163
State officials acting through the NCSL and the NGA often
succeed in persuading members of Congress that certain federal
laws impose restrictions on state governments that are
overbroad, inappropriately onerous, or too expensive.164 One
example of the NGA's success is the full mobilization and
coalition building that it organized to lobby for the passage of
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), the
most expensive and extensive public works legislation ever
passed by Congress.16 5 TEA-21 devolved a good deal of the

160. Kenyon, supra note 13, at 451.

161. Note, The Lesson of Lopez: The Political Dynamics of Federalism's Political
Safeguards, 119 HARV. L. REV. 609, 621 (2005).

162. See Carol S. Weissert, Promise and Perils of State-Based Road to Universal
Health Insurance in the U.S., 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 42, 67 (2004).
163. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 79
(2004).
164. See Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of
Separationof Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 51 (2003).
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decision-making on major transportation projects to state and
local leaders.166 The NGA lobbying strategy included pressing
its members to promote the states' needs to members of
Congress, calling for governors to testify before Congress, and
pressing state delegations.167 Certainly lobbying for the state
death tax credit is not as important to the states as transportation
projects in terms of either dollars or infrastructure, but the
methods that the NGA utilized to influence Congress to pass the
TEA-21 could be applied. State leaders through the NGA could
impress upon members of Congress how important the revenue
from the credit is to the states. In lobbying, state leaders might
also mention with a wink and a nudge how important their
partisan machinery and support is to the congressperson's reelection prospects.
There is already some precedent for this type of lobbying.
In 2001, the NGA lobbied against the accelerated phase-out of
the state death tax credit as discussed above in Part V.
Currently, the NGA is conducting limited lobbying of the
federal government to try to get Congress to work more closely
with the states when it revises the Code.' 68 In its "Federal Tax
Policy" position paper, the NGA cited "the accelerated
elimination of the state death tax credit" as an example of
Congress restricting the states' right to determine their own tax
structure, either directly or indirectly.169 The NGA implored
Congress to "consider the significant impact that its decisions
can have on state authority" and asked for more careful tax
coordination between
the federal, state, and local
70
governments.1 The NGA should expand these efforts and more
clearly advocate that it wants Congress to reinstate the credit as
Passage of the TEA-21, 32 PUBLIUS No. 1 at 53 (2002).
166. Id. at 46.
167. Id. at 53.
168. See Fed. Tax Policy Position, NAT'L GOVERNOR'S ASS'N, Feb. 27, 2008,
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.8358ec82f5bl98dl8a278110501010a0/
?vgnextoid=2c8a9e2flbO9l010VgnVCM100000laOlOlOaRCRD&vgnextchannel=4bl8
f074f0d9ffOOVgnVCM1O0000la0lOlOaRCRD.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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part of any reformed federal estate tax.
The NCSL does not appear to have taken on the same
lobbying role that the NGA has in terms of the credit, either
during the 2001 EGTRRA debate, or in any recent statements. A
search of the NCSL website did not reveal any position paper or
stance on the estate tax or the state death tax credit.1 7' It is
difficult to speculate why the NCSL has not taken the same steps
as the NGA has to lobby for the state death tax credit. It is likely
that any lack of lobbying has to do with the fact that the NCSL is
a bipartisan organization (although the NGA is also bipartisan)
and many Republicans oppose the estate tax and resulting state
death tax credit.
Nonetheless, Republican members of the NGA or the NCSL
could support lobbying efforts for the credit, without
compromising their opposition to the federal estate tax. The
argument is as follows. While the Democrats control the
Whitehouse, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, they
are likely to pass or maintain a federal estate tax. Under this
system, the Republican NCSL member's wealthy constituents
will have their estates taxed, regardless of whether the payment
goes to the federal government or the states. The Republican
NCSL member should lobby to have the state death tax credit
reinstated to at least ensure that his or her state gets to share
some of the revenue. Additionally, under the state death tax
credit system, the states did not have to monitor or regulate the
tax system because the federal government audited any suspect
estate tax returns. 172 A reinstatement of the system would
therefore reduce state bureaucracy in states that have state estate
taxes, another Republican ideal. In contrast, Democrats are
more likely willing to advocate for the state death tax credit
system because the system indirectly promotes the progression
of taxes through the federal estate tax.
Lobbying is really the states' only alternative because there
does not appear to be an option for litigation. The states have no
171. NSCL NEWS, supra note 144.
172. See id. at Part II.
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claim under the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act because the
repeal of the state death tax credit did not impose any kind of
"enforceable duty" on the states.173 There is also no likely
challenge under Printz v. United States, or any related federalism
jurisprudence because the federal government is not requiring
the states to change their state taxation system in any way.174
In short, Republican and Democratic NCSL or NGA
members should find enough common ground in their support
of the state death tax credit to lobby Congress during the
upcoming estate tax debate. Many states already face severe
state deficits that make any fight for dollars critical, and the
mobility of the Boomers creates an unknown variable for any
state trying to design its own estate tax.
POSSIBLE DOWNFALL OF LOBBYING EFFORTS

Although the author suggests lobbying as the only solution,
he is prudent enough to realize that lobbying might not succeed.
State leaders could lobby until they are blue in the face and still
have very little impact on the outcome of the federal estate tax
debate. First, it is more difficult to have the credit passed by
Congress anew rather than to simply have the credit continued.
Second, despite their last-minute lobbying efforts, the states
could not prevent Congress from phasing out the credit in 2001,
and their voice is not any more likely to be heard during any
2009 debate.
Third, while state leaders do have some leverage over
members of Congress by promising use of their political
machinery and support, state leaders have less leverage when it
comes to an obscure provision like the credit. 17s Most members
of Congress, along with the vast majority of their constituents,
are not likely to know about the credit, and are therefore not
173. Sheppach, supra note 26.
174. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
175. The Lessons of Lopez, supra note 161, at 622 ("The intergovernmental lobby's
success turns upon its ability to offer legislators something valuable in exchange for
their support. . . .").
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likely to care about its reinstatement. This is probably one of the
most important reasons that state leaders' efforts to have the
Graham Amendment to EGTRRA passed in 2001 failed and why
their current mobilization is limited at best. No state leader
likely wants to commit to lobbying for the credit because the
leader has few bargaining chips with Congress or any talking
points that constituents care about. Moreover, despite the
argument above, Republican NGA members are not likely to
advocate for the credit because they will not want to be seen as
advocating for the "death" tax in any way. Finally, state leaders'
pleas are likely to fall on deaf congressional ears because of the
federal budget crunch. Without the state death tax credit, the
federal government gets to keep all estate tax revenue; a
solution, although a modest one, to deal with the current federal
deficits topping $1 trillion dollars resulting from the War in Iraq
and Hurricane Katrina, but does not even include the Wall Street
bailout.17 6
The states' lobbying efforts could be likened to a Hail Mary
pass in football. Congress is not likely to "catch" the ball and
enact the state death tax credit, but the states are no worse off for
having tried.
CONCLUSION
By passing EGTRRA, Congress phased-out and repealed the
state death tax credit system that had augmented state treasuries
for eight decades. The states have responded in several ways.
Many states have chosen to let their state estate taxes lapse with
the repeal of the credit. Other states have chosen to maintain or
reinstate some version of a state estate tax. Retirees' decisions,
highlighted by the potential mobility of Baby Boomers, have left
many states concerned that any state estate tax imposed will
cause their wealthy retirees to move to tax-free states. Wealthy
176. See John D. McKinnon, Deficit Widens on Falling Tax Receipts, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 29, 2008, at A4 (President Bush's projected $410 billion budget deficit for FY
2008 could climb to as high as $500 billion); see also U.S. Deficit Would Top $1 Trillion
with New Method, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 15, 2008.
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retirees should carefully consider their domicile choice.
Overwhelming, much of the concern over retiree migration
is many states' preoccupation with growing budget deficits. As
states' budget deficits grow, all viable revenue sources become
important and a reinstatement of the state death tax credit is no
exception. State leaders might find that their lobbying pleas fall
on more sympathetic ears with the election of President Obama.
Regardless, as EGTRRA sunsets at the end of 2009, there is likely
to be a great deal of political discourse about the efficacy of the
estate tax. The states should actively lobby during this debate to
increase the chance that Congress will reinstate the credit. The
NGA and the NCSL, despite their bipartisan composition,
should take active leadership roles to ensure that the states get
some portion of any estate tax revenue in the form of a
reinstatement of the credit. While these lobbying efforts could
very well fail because the states have little leverage over
Congress, it is certainly worth advocating for a state death tax
credit system that succeeded for eighty years.

